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LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE
BAR TO PERFORM ITS PUBLIC DUTIES.*
The function of a profession as such is to perform some
service vital to the well-being of the community. The
function of the legal profession is to administer justice.
Whether at any particular time in any particular country
that service is being efficiently performed must be tested
by the answer of the facts to three questions. First, Are
the ethical standards of the members of the profession clear
and tending to improve? Second, Does the law, whether
expressed in the development of "cases" or legislation tend
to correspond to the felt sense of right in the community?
Third, Is the law administered with reasonable certainty
and dispatch?
If the first question is answered in the negative, it means
that a large and increasing number of the profession are
preying on the weaker members of the community. If the
law does not satisfy the community's ideal of justice, class
hatred and the instability of the whole social organization
*An address delivered by Mr. Lewis before the Legal Section of the
American Bar Association, as Chairman of the Section, at St. Paul,

Minnesota, August 29th, igo6.
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is the result; the evils which flow from uncertain or longdelayed administration of the law are of a similr character.
How does our profession answer these three tests 91
efficiency? Can any of us say that taken as a whole we have
clear-cut ideals of professional right conduct, and purge
ourselves of those who fail to live up to proper professional
standards ? The universal presence among us of the ambulance-chaser, unrebuked by our courts, and the fact that we
practically never disbar a lawyer except after he has been
indicted and convicted for a criminal offense, are significant
commentaries on our ethical standards and the way in
which we guard what we are pleased to call the traditions of
the profession. The question is not whether the bar is
worse from a moral point of view than it'was; it is enough
to make the answer we must give to the first test of efficiency
doubtful, that we do not insist upon a high standard of conduct among our members, and that in this respect the
observer finds few if any signs of improvement.
On the other hand, if we turn to the law as found in our
decided cases, we can with pardonable pride maintain
that our courts meet new conditions as they arise with
ability.' For instance, the way in which legal questions
arising out of trade- and labor-disputes have been dealt
with shows that we do possess the capacity to mold our common law to new conditions. In this respect I believe the
present compares favorably with any period of English or
American legal history. In legislation on legal subjects
we have not as a profession shown any marked ability either
to initiate useful reforms in substantive law or to express
the existing law in statutory form. Whether a beneficial
civil code can be formed is doubtful and it is therefore no
reflection on the profession that, with one or possibly two
exceptions, the attempts at such codification have apparently
failed to prove satisfactory; but it may fairly be a subject
of adverse comment that in the last fifty years we have not
in America initiated a single legislative reform in substantive law. The great legislative reform in our substantive
law in the last century-the change in the legal status of
married women-was largely copied in its various stages
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from Acts of Parliament.

The same is true of our nego-

tiable-instrument law. The fact that we have reached the
stage of being able to suggest to our legislature that they
follow legislation on private rights adopted with advantage
by other countries, though nothing to be proud of, is in itself
a good sign.
On the side of the administration of the law, both civil
and criminal, our failure to perform the service which the
community may of right expect is almost complete. The
two fatal words "uncertainty," "delay" are interwoven in
all our methods of doing legal business. The practical
result of our antiquated systems in the complicated conditions of our social and business life would disgrace the
early part of the nineteenth century, when practically all
business was performed in a cumbersome way, but to a
modem business man, accustomed to modem and efficient
methods of dispatching business, the delays and uncertainties of our administration of the law have become intolerable, while at the same time affording a sure refuge to the
unscrupulous. In view of the just reputation of our people
for quickness and efficiency, this grotesque condition of the
administration of justice would be laughable if it were not
so serious. The absurdities of the administration of our
criminal law have allowed the hysteria which exists in a
more or less positive form in every community to find outward expression in the crime of lynching: the delay of the
civil law, tending to deprive the economical work of justice,
has been a potent factor in creating that widespread disrespect for law, and distrust of courts, which render it increasingly difficult for us to meet the new and complicated
problems of our social life.
Though the answers to the tests of the way in which the
legal profession is performing its service to our communities
are not all unfavorable, taken as a whole the word failure
predominates. Disguise it as we may, our profession is
not administering justice with efficiency.
If we look more closely at the lines along which these
failures occur, we will find that it is in what one may call
the public duties of the profession, rather than in its private
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duties. For instance, the lawyer as an individual practitioner performs his whole duty, if, taking existing methods
of doing legal business, he conducts his client's case with
skill. The judge performs his whole duty to the parties
before him, if he properly applies to their case the existing
principles of law. But on the profession as a whole falls
the duty of providing methods of practice which result in the
quick and certain dispatch of legal business. This last is
an example of what we may call the public duty of the pro.
fession, as distinguished from the private duty of individual members. The public duty is a duty which cannot be
performed by the individual lawyer in the course of his
practice, but must be performed, if at all, by associate action.
My point is, that it is in associate action on legal-public
matters that we fail, raLther than in those duties which depend solely on our own efforts. The public do not generally
complain of poor lawyers, but of. the delays and uncertainties of the law. The common law, as developed by our
courts, each acting separately, meets new situations as they
arise, but where concerted action to effect legislation is demanded we fail. Taken as a whole the conduct of individual members of the bar represents a fairly high standard,
yet when that standard is violated by individuals there is
not, except in extreme cases, any associate action taken to
discipline the offender. In short, in a world marked for
increasing efficiency in organization, the lawyers of our
country exhibit the anomalous spectacle of a body of persons
apparently incapable of efficient co6peration for public ends.
When the individual makes a failure of his life, he usually
blames external conditions-The fates were against him, if
that which happened to Jones had happened to him, he, like
Jones, would have been a great success.
So with the apologists for the failure of our profession
to perform its appointed work. Take our failure to force
individual lawyers to conform to a proper ethical standard.
It is said that when our cities were small it was comparatively easy for the leaders of the profession to come into
contact with all members in active practice, and hold a strict
rein over their conduct, but that to-day, in cities like New
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York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, this is impossible. The
explanation sounds plausible, but London is nearly as large
as all those three cities combined, and the supervision of the
Bar over their individual members down to the smallest
detail of professional conduct is most strict. It is true that
the increase in the numbers of the profession may require
different machinery to deal with cases of improper professional conduct; but is not the ability to meet new conditions
a test of efficiency?
Again, it is said that the delays of the civil law are
due to the complicated nature of our business transactions.
But do not these delays occur in the simplest cases? Our
business transactions are no more complicated than those
of England, and yet the English have succeeded in devising
a system which disposes of legal business with reasonable
celerity. But I can hear the apologist replying that England with a single Bar can carry out reforms, but for us,
who are merely a collection of innumerable State and
County Bars, it is impossible. It may be admitted that the
fact that we do not have a single system of courts, and
therefore necessarily have many Bars, renders it difficult
to adopt a single plan to expedite justice, or deal with other
professional problems, but the almost universal failure of
the Bar of any one of our States to adopt any reform (which
goes to the root of the causes of the delays and uncertainties
of our legal proceedings) is not explained by the fact that
there cannot be a Bar of the United States in the sense
that there is an English Bar.
Again it is said that our country is new, and that our
problems are therefore more difficult. Yet our country
can only properly be said to be new in spots, and the failure
to maintain professional standards and expedite legal business is as great, if not greater, in the Eastern than in the
Western States. England, too, has colonies in which all
the conditions of a new country exist, yet it is true of these
colonies, as it is of England, that the people are satisfied
with the celerity of administration of the law, both civil and
criminal. In the colonies, as in England, in the last seventyfive years not a single life has been sacrificed to mob vio-
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lence, a fact which bears eloquent tribute to the confidence
of the people in the courts.
Lastly, if you will talk to a lawyer on the reasons which
make for greater efficiency in the administration of the law
in England, he will usually point to .the high salaries of
English judges, and the aristocratic origin of the English
Barristers as a class, as the true cause of efficiency on the
other side of the water. To one who doubts, as I do not,
the ability of a democracy to govern, this last reason appeals
with almost conclusive force; yet, even to the admirer of
aristocracies, the reason given must disappear on examination. English judges were better paid relatively to the
standard of the rest of the community in the days of Lord
Eldon than they are now; but, the crying evil of the chancery of that day was the very delays which are the worst
features of our own legal administration. Again the Bar
of England never was distinctly aristocratic. It is less so
now than ever before. Membership in it is open to any one;
English citizenship is not even required. One of the leading barristers to-day is an American citizen. Indeed the
efficiency of the administration of law in England seems to
have increased as the Bar has become more and more democratic. If an aristocratic bar meant efficiency, why does
not an aristocratic army mean efficiency-? If the national
administration of democratic America compares, as I think
it does, favorably with that of England, why not our administration of law? Our medical profession is forging ahead
of their English competitors; why do we of the law lag
behind?
Though an individual when he makes a failure of his life
turns for an explanation to external conditions, the real
root of the matter usually lies in his character--not necessarily in his bad character, but in the fact that his character
does not conform to the necessities of his external circumstances. So it is with any group of men, as the members
of the legal profession. Our failure to meet with efficiency
what I have called our public duties is not due to external
conditions, but to our character as professional men. By
this "character" I mean our ideals of our professional duty.
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The reputable American lawyer, if he is typical of his class,
has an ideal of correct conduct toward clients, toward the
court, and toward the other members of the Bar. But here
his ideals usually end. He is blind to any public duty of
the profession toward the community as a whole. Even his
comparatively feeble efforts to enforce some standard of
professional conduct, or to relieve some local delays in the
administration of justice by the establishment of new courts,
seem to be largely dictated by the feeling that a Bar composed in part of criminals, or courts having a great congestion of business, increase, for decent lawyers, the difficulties
of practice. Interest in the public welfare is not, apparently, a real factor. This blindness to the existence of
public obligations is so general, and so absolute, that even
in this presence I may be pardoned for giving a few
illustrations.
Besides this American Bar Association, there is a State.
Bar Association in the majority of the States, and innumerable county organizations. But as far as I can ascertain
no one of them ever appointed a committee to examine any
question relating to the care of criminals. Even in efforts
to deal with the trial and punishment of juvenile offenders
the community has gone unaided by any effort on the part of
these numerous legal organizations. The most unobservant
person who enters at all into the life of the community in
which he lives must have had forced upon his notice the
growing dissatisfaction with the delays of justice. The
crime of lynching has become a menace to the stability of the
whole administration of the criminal law. Other common
law countries, England and her colonies, have made great
improvements in their legal administration, and have been
working successfully under those improvements for more
than thirty years. While these facts have been pointed out
by individuals at our meetings, and while occasionally committees have been appointed to investigate the causes of the
delays in the administration of justice, we cannot say that
a single important association has, as a body, seriously taken
up the work of improving the administration of the law.
Or, again, no one of us doubts that the poorest classes
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of the community, especially the very poor in our large
cities, are as a class largely denied justice, partly through
their own ignorance, but in a still greater degree by the
class of attorneys who take advantage of that ignorance. I
am well aware of the practical difficulties in the way of the
establishment and maintenance of what is called "legal aid."
Whether the problem presented by the administration of
justice among the very poor should be met as they meet it
on the Continent of Europe, or on lines developed by such
societies as the New York or Philadelphia Legal Aid Societies, is for my present purpose immaterial. The striking
fact remains that the community has to face this problem
of legal administration without the aid of any legal professional organization. It never occurs to our Bar Association that this is their problem, and that they owe a duty to
the community to try to solve it.
Instances might be multiplied, but I think those that I
have given prove my point, which is, that our failure as a
profession to perform what I have designated our public
duties is due principally, not to external conditions, but to
a total absence of any idea that there exists any obligation
on the part of the Bar toward the community. As a profession we lack any idea of responsibility which cannot be
classified as a duty toward a court, a client, or. a fellowlawyer. Lawyers have as a rule a real sense of a duty
toward clients, but little or no sense whatever of any duty
toward the community as a whole for the better administration of justice. We are in exactly the position to-day that
the medical profession would be in if they assumed that
action by medical societies should as a matter of course be
confined to problems connected with the cure of disease, and
that they had nothing to do as organizations with the prevention of disease by communities, and that there was no
position of leadership which it was their duty to assume, in
matters pertaining to the general health of the community.
The same medical profession which a hundred years ago
was recognized as a profession only to cast a shadow on the
social position of those that followed it, is to-day performing
its functions to the satisfaction of the community. When
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the history of the present time comes to be written it is likely
that the reforms and advances in the science of the protection of communities from disease will be cited as one of its
chief glories. Why this success in the performance of public duties where we are failing? It is not in individual
character or ability. Man for man we are as able as they,
and as moral as they. Is it not rather that they have developed, in a way we have not developed, an ideal of communal responsibility? Or, again, do not our English
brethren of Bench and Bar perform the function of the
administration of justice better than we do, and to the entire
satisfaction of the community, not because they are better
lawyers but because they possess, in a degree we do not, a
sense that they are members of a profession which has active
public duties to perform?
Assuming that I am right in saying that we are failing
as a profession in this country in the performance of services
which the community has a right to expect that we will perform, and that this failure is along the line of our public,
as distinguished from our private duties; and furthermore,
assuming that this failure to perform our obligations to the
community as a whole is due to the almost total absence of
any conception that we have any duties of this character,
it becomes a task of no great difficulty to show that the
absence of any feeling of public responsibility among the
members of our profession is due to defects in our legal
education.
We have three systems of legal education in this country
-the office system, the night-school system, and the University Law School system. The first needs no explanation.
By the night-school system I mean that system which prepares a man for the Bar by having him attend law classes,
the requirements being arranged on the assumption that the
student pursues some other occupation during the period of
his attendance. Many such classes are connected with universities, but this fact does not make the system a university
system of instruction under the above classification. By a
university system of legal education I mean a system which
requires the student to be in residence at a school which
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maintains not only class rooms but a library for study;
which has not only lectures on law, but a resident corps
of men devoting their lives to legal teaching and research,
and which demands of their students, by occupying their
entire time, exclusive devotion to the work of the school.
It is not my present purpose to go into the relative merits
of these three systems from the point of view of the preparation which each gives for the work of a lawyer in the conduct of litigation. My present purpose is to point out that
each fails to produce lawyers who come to the work of their
profession with any idea that the profession, as such, has
public duties to perform. That the office system, and the
night-school system, should fail in this respect, seems the
inevitable result of the ideals -which keep these systems alive.
The system which permits a man to come to the Bar after
a period of registration in the office of a practitioner of his
own selection, is based on the idea that all that lawyers as
such need to know are the matters which come up in the
private practice of the law. This very conception negatives
any idea that the profession has any public duties to perform
in the sense in which I have used the word public.
The office system assumes that taken as a whole the profession has nothing to learn; that the skill, knowledge, and
morals of the average member of the Bar in active practice
leaves nothing to be desired. For it is to be remembered
that it is with the average member of the Bar of any community that the office students as a class register, not with
the best or the worst. If the average is good in ethical
conduct, the student product will in that respect be good.
If the ideals of the Bar taken as a whole are low, the ideals
of the student product will be low also. As well may a man
try to raise himself by his bootstraps as to have a profession
elevate itself morally or intellectually by such a system. If,
as in England, the student registered in and became at once
a part of a strong Bar Association, organized for the purpose of maintaining and uplifting professional standards,
then we might expect progressive improvement from generation to generation, at least in moral tone, if not in intellectual equipment. But under the office system, as we know
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it in this country, no improvement is possible. The best
proof of which statement lies in the fact that while for generations this system has been the recognized system for
preparation for the Bar, no marked improvement in morals
or efficiency has taken place, if indeed, there has not been,
as many contend, a deterioration.
That the night-school system fails to produce a class of
men who, however honorable they may be as individuals,
fail to grasp the fact that the profession has obligations to
the public to perform, is also inevitable. There are many
"night schools" created and maintained by charlatans for
the fees. Were they all of this class even our illy-organized
profession would have prevented their filling the nominal
ranks of the profession with their dupes. The system taken
as a whole is maintained, however, not by charlatans, but
by those who have the interest of the profession sincerely at
heart. As a system of legal education the night-school
system is a grotesque perversion of what at bottom is an
idea on which much of our progress as a nation depends.
This is the idea that every man should have a chance to
enter any occupation he desires. Here are a host of poor
young men. They wish to be lawyers; it is assumed, and
doubtless correctly assumed, that many of them will never
come to the Bar if they are obliged for three, of even two
years, to devote their entire time to legal studies. Ergo,
some means must be found to get them to Bar without requiring their whole time. If we cannot fit them very well
we will do the best we can. And so nearly all our large
cities witness overworked lawyers and judges of our highest
courts sacrificing sometimes for good pay, but often for
little or no. compensation, one or more of their evenings
each week in order to instruct young men in the rudiments
of law, who in the daytime are engaged as stenographers,
clerks in government and private employ, and in other occupations. A night school here and there may try to give
something not required by the Bar examination of the State
in which it is situated, but the very conception which lies
at the root of the whole system predestines to failure all such
efforts. That conception is: We must not ask of the young
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man who desires to be a lawyer too great a sacrifice. The
important thing is to get him to the Bar so that he may
have a chance.
And may I not say in passing that the idea that every
man should have a chance is a good one? Let us .hold
fast to it. But remember that the chance to which you
or I or anyone is entitled is the chance to become as good
and useful a member of the community in the line of life
which we elect as we are capable of becoming. It is not
a right to a chance to become a second-class man when we
have it in us to develop into a first-class man. To be specific, we have not the right to a chance to become any kind of
a lawyer with any kind of ideals, but a right to a chance to
become intellectually the best lawyer we are capable o f becoming; and morally-for we have a right to a moral as
well as an intellectual opportunity--the right to a chance
to come to the Bar with those ideals of our professional
obligations which will lead to the efficient performance of
our moral duties towards our clients, the court, and the
community.
Let us now turn to our university system of legal professional education. The profession is justly proud of the
work of several of our leading university law schools along
purely intellectual lines, especially their work in common
law and equity. Situated at seats of learning, many of
which are old enough to have "traditions," and an "atmosphere," one would imagine that students would be instilled
with professional ideals which would lead them as a class,
not only to have a lively sense of their duty to maintain and
see that others maintained the highest professional standards
in their relations to courts and clients, but that they would
also realize the public functions of the profession, and be
alive to those general problems of the administration of
justice which the community have a right to expect that the
profession make an earnest effort to solve.
I think we may admit that the students of our best university law schools do graduate as a rule with a high sense of
their personal obligations towards courts and clients. This
is partly due to the class from which the students are re-
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cruited, partly to the effects of the prior college -education
which the major portion of them have had, but mainly to
the daily personal contact with the resident members of the
law faculty, who are usually men not only of legal ability
but high moral tone. Indeed, the modem well-equipped
university law school tends to preserve that personal contact between student and high-minded lawyer which was the
best feature of the old office system, when the student registered with a man of high tone, who had leisure to come
into personal contact with him. It may also be admitted
that the product of our university law schools have as a class
a feeling that the tone of the profession should be preserved
by disciplining those who fall below its standards, and
personal contact with the younger members of the Bar who
are the products of our universities leads me to believe that
as they come to leadership in our profession we may expect
to see greater activity among boards of censors. On the
other hand, the graduates of our best university law schools
seem as- utterly lacking in any conception that the profession has any duties toward the community as a whole,
or that they as individuals need concern themselves with any
problems not met with in private practice, as are the products
of the lawyers' offices, or the graduates of the night schools.
Here the fault lies not with the nature of the system. The
student of the type of which I speak does not ask that the
faculty prepare him to pass a Bar examination in the quickest possible time, or allow him leisure to work at other
things while pursuing his legal studies. He comes prepared
to devote himself exclusively to preparing for his life work.
If he graduates with ideals that do not fit in with what the
world wants from our profession it is the fault of the faculty,
not of the student. Turn to the curriculum of any one of
our great university law schools, and the cause of the failure
is not far to seek. One who is familiar with the ideals
which prevail in the best schools of other professions is
instantly struck by three things: First, the thorough way
in which the field of private law is covered; second, the
meager way in which public law is dealt with; third, the
entire absence of any course from which the student can
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gain a knowledge of or interest in any problem relating to
the administration of justice, which does not tend to answer
a question which may be stated in the following form:
"If a client comes into your office and brings the following
case, how would you advise him? " Look at the catalogue
of any one of our great schools and you will see at a glance
that the faculty have one and only one conception of their
duty towards their students, and that is to turn them out
able to answer any legal question likely to be put to them
by private clients. Now I do not wish to belittle for a
moment the absolute necessity of training the law student
to practice law in the world as it is. It goes without saying
that it is the duty of the lawyer to serve his clients not only
faithfully, but efficiently. But I do take the position that
the whole duty of a lawyer is not done when, taking law and
practice as it is, he gives his clients good advice, prepares
his cases thoroughly, or as a judge decides them, in view
of the law, properly. There is, as I have tried to show, a
public duty of the profession toward the community. The
problem,-How should I try this case ?-and the problem,--How should cases be tried?-are distinct problems. One
must be dealt with by the lawyer acting as an individual,
the other by lawyers acting together. But lawyers as
a class cannot be expected to meet the problems which
confront them as a body of men, charged with certain public
duties, unless in their student days their instructors have
recognized the existence of such problems and taken pains
to see that the students had some knowledge of the principles on which they must be solved.
Take some examples of my meaning. We have in all our
university law schools courses in Practice. Without exception, as far as I am aware, these courses either deal exclus-

ively with the present practice in a particular jurisdiction,
or with the essentials of present practice in our State jurisdictions. Such courses, it is conceded, are a necessary part
of the legal curriculum. Any law student intending to practice law should know his profession as an art as well as a
science. But why not also a course on Practice dealt with

from the point of view of the community-a course which
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would deal with the efforts made in different jurisdictions
to expedite justice, or improve the administration of the civil
or the criminal law, and the result of these efforts? Such
a course would at least give us a body of men who know
what was going forward in the way of improvement, and we
would not be confined to occasional papers at bar meetings to
give us information and arouse our interest in the swift and
certain administration of the law.
Or, again, many of our schools have courses, or extra
lectures, on "Conveyancing."
These courses deal with the
methods invoked in a particular jurisdiction or with the general methods followed in those jurisdictions, where the
pupils expect to practice. Again, I have no criticism.
Such course prepares the future lawyer for his work. But
still the question arises,-Is the duty of the profession done
in respect to conveyancing when we draw proper deeds for
our clients ?-or, as a profession, have we a duty to see to it
that the system in force in our community is the most efficient
system which in view of our circumstances can be devised?
And if we have this last duty, how can we expect that duty
to be impressed on the lawyer, unless in his student days
those who regulate the curriculum he must follow give him
an opportunity to find out the changes in the system of conveyancing which have taken place in nearlr all civilized
countries in the last fifty years? Such a course might or
might not lead him to be an advocate of the "Torrens system," but at least it would tend to enable him to take an
interest in a problem which it is the duty of our profession
as a profession to take an interest in.
I have given two examples. If time permitted others
might be added. Enough, however, perhaps has been said
to enable you to catch my meaning, which is that our great
universities have an opportunity which is not open to the
other systems of legal education,-the office system, and
the night-school system,-to produce a body of lawyers
who, while effective practitioners, are also intelligently interested in those problems which we as a -profession must
meet by associate action, and that those of us who, like
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myself, are responsible for the curriculum of these schools
are neglecting our opportunity.
But I hear some one say, You cannot get a body of
young men bent on learning law so as to make a living,
spend time on matters not directly pertaining to private
practice. And why not?-I ask. The great medical schools
of the country have in the last few years done for the medical profession exactly what I am asking the great law
schools to do for the legal profession. They have added to
their curriculum a number of courses which bear on the
public functions of the medical profession,-that is, the
function of preventive medicine, and the causes, as distinguished from the cure, of disease. And -the establishment
of these courses has had to meet the same kind of objection
that our law schools may expect if they attempt to add to
their law courses subjects of the character I have indicated
namely, that such subjects had nothing to do with the
practice of medicine, which was the cure of the man already
sick.
Again, I hear the objection: Three years is a time all
too short to fit a student to become an efficient praciitioner,
and addition along the line indicated means a course of
four years or more. Suppose it does? The medical profession almost universally requires four years, and hospital
practice besides, and yet the need for doctors is being met.
Remember that the community is not interested in the number of years which it takes to, make a doctor or a lawyer,
but in the efficiency of the finished product. If four years,
as in medicine, or five years as on the Continent of Europe,
are really necessary to make a good lawyer, the public will
have no sympathy with hurrying out in three years an
unfinished product.
Of course, any radical addition to the scope of legal
teaching means additional expense which may not be, and
perhaps ought not to be, met by additional fees. If our
present university law schools should undertake to turn out
men not only prepared to practice law, but fitted to take their
share in progressive movements for the improvement of the
administration of justice, the schools must have endowments
adequate for the work. To-day these endowments do not
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exist. But once let our great universities prove to the communities in which they are situated that there is a necessity
for widening the scope of their law teaching, and that if
the scope is widened they are prepared to do work which the
community has a real interest in having done, the endowment will come. Money has flowed towards our great
medical schools because they have proved that the medical
profession can do more for the world than give pills to the
sick. Our great law schools can obtain like endowments
when they can show that they are doing something more for
the world than hurrying out men who can win cases. Pillgiving and case-winning are essential, but the purse-strings
of the community unloose only when a profession proves
that it can do something for the permanent amelioration
of social conditions.
Our ideals shape our actions. The lawyer is no exception
to this rule. The lawyers of the United States fail to perfrom what I have called the public duties of the profession,
while the English lawyer and our brethren of the medical
profession to a large extent perform their public duties, because they have and we have not any idea that we have such
duties. This lack of perception has its root in our legal
education. For the law offices and the night school there
is an adequate excuse. But for the university law school
there is no such excuse. If, as a profession, we are to awake
to our failure to perform our public duties, it is the small
class of men who are devoting their lives to legal teaching
who must point the way.
From a professional point of view the need of the hour
is a body of lawyers who know something beyond the practice of their profession; who are interested in the administration of justice in its broadest sense; who can turn with
effect to those legal problems which call for their.solution
on associate action. I believe if the faculties of our universities widen their curriculum along the lines indicated, they
can create a university law-school system which will produce
a body of lawyers whose ideals and, therefore, whose
actions, fit in more closely than do the ideals of their present
product with the needs of the modern world.
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